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OPINION OF THE COURT

NYGAARD, Circuit Judge.
Plaintiffs Michael J. Whittle and James Calandrillo
appeal from the summary judgment granted to the defendants in
this action under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29
U.S.C. § 185.

The district court held that plaintiff-appellants'

hybrid duty of fair representation claim was time-barred.

We

will reverse.
I.
This case involves a seniority dispute brought about
when defendant Yellow Freight System, Inc. began to reorganize
its New Jersey terminal operations.

Appellants were originally

hired to work in Yellow's Carlstadt terminal, where they were
represented by Teamsters Local 641.

Later, Yellow opened its

Little Falls terminal, staffing it with employees from Carlstadt
and another terminal in Rockaway.

Positions at Little Falls were

filled in accordance with the change of operations procedure
contained in the National Master Freight Agreement, which
provides for staffing new terminals on the basis of seniority.
Appellants wished to follow the work and transfer to
the Little Falls terminal, believing that their employment
opportunities would be greater at the new facility.
Unfortunately, they did not have sufficient seniority to bid for
jobs at Little Falls.

They approached the union's business

agent, John Barnes, requesting that he help arrange a transfer.
Barnes discussed the matter with company representative Jack
Hall, who initially expressed reservations about allowing
appellants to transfer, believing that it might eventually lead

to a seniority dispute.

Nevertheless, Yellow did allow

appellants to transfer to Little Falls, on condition that they
execute an agreement under which the appellants would retain
their company seniority for noncompetitive benefits such as
health insurance and the pension plan, but would be assigned a
new terminal seniority date for the allocation of all benefits
for which workers compete, such as assignment of work.
This arrangement apparently worked satisfactorily until
Yellow opened another terminal in Pine Brook, New Jersey and
closed its Little Falls facility.

Yellow planned to staff the

Pine Brook terminal with employees from Little Falls and
Rockaway, and this evidently made appellants apprehensive about
their seniority vis-a-vis the Rockaway employees.

They met with

Barnes and inquired whether their full seniority would be
restored after the move to Pine Brook.

Barnes offered no

comfort, however, taking the position that the agreement
appellants signed in 1988 worked a permanent forfeiture of their
Carlstadt seniority.
Although appellants knew that employees from Rockaway
with less company seniority had been placed higher on the Pine
Brook competitive seniority list,1 they waited until December 7,
1990 before grieving.

Barnes then brought the matter to

1Appellants assert on appeal that they noticed for the first
time in December 1990 that the Rockaway employees had greater
competitive seniority. They have provided no citation to the
record to support their assertion, hence we will disregard it.

arbitration.

On March 26, 1991, the Joint Local Committee of

North Jersey held a hearing, at which Barnes merely explained to
the Committee "exactly how everything happened" regarding the
seniority and transfers.

Appellants were present at the hearing,

but did not dispute or add to anything Barnes said.

Although the

grievance was not filed until eleven months after appellants'
January 2, 1990 transfer to Pine Brook, Yellow never asserted at
the hearing that the grievance was untimely.

The Committee ruled

against appellants the day of the hearing, mailing a written
confirmation on May 2, 1991.
On September 25, 1991, appellants filed this hybrid
suit under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 185.

They alleged that Yellow's action with respect to their

seniority violated the collective bargaining agreement and that
Local 641's failure to prosecute their cause vigorously before
the Joint Local Committee breached the union's duty of fair
representation.
The district court granted summary judgment to
appellees, holding that appellants' suit was time-barred.

After

concluding that their cause of action accrued on January 2, 1990,
it reasoned that appellants' failure to file either a grievance
or a legal action within six months of that date made their
federal suit untimely.

Relying on Benson v. General Motors

Corp., 716 F.2d 862 (11th Cir. 1983), the court held that the

limitations period begins to run when the employee knew or should
have known of the loss of seniority.

We disagree.

II.
For limitation of actions, a cause accrues when it is
sufficiently ripe that one can maintain suit on it.

Skyberg v.

United Food & Commercial Workers Int'l Union, 5 F.3d 297, 301
(8th Cir. 1993) (quoting Santos v. District Council of United
Bhd. of Carpenters, 619 F.2d 963, 968-69 (2d Cir. 1980)); City of
Philadelphia v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, 994 F.2d 112, 121 (3d Cir.
1993); Ghartey v. St. John's Queens Hosp., 869 F.2d 160, 163 (2d
Cir. 1989).

Accordingly, the six-month limitations period for

this action could have run only if appellants were entitled to
file their suit on January 2, 1990.
The Benson plaintiffs agreed to cede their existing
seniority in exchange for "preferential consideration" at another
General Motors plant.

They transferred to the other facility,

but received no preferential treatment and were soon laid off.
They then filed a hybrid suit against their employer and their
union.

Because the collective bargaining agreement required that

seniority lists be posted, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
held that the limitations period started to run as soon as the
list was posted and the employees knew they had lost seniority.
716 F.2d at 864.

Significantly, however, the seniority dispute

in Benson was neither grieved nor arbitrated, because both
parties took the position that the matter was not arbitrable.
See Benson v. General Motors Corp., 539 F. Supp. 55, 56 (N.D.
Ala. 1981), vacated, 716 F.2d 862 (11th Cir. 1983).
When a grievance procedure does apply, the employeeplaintiff is required to at least attempt to exhaust his or her
remedies under that procedure before a § 301 suit can be filed
against the employer.

DelCostello v. International Bhd. of

Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 163, 103 S. Ct. 2281, 2290 (1983);
Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 652, 85 S. Ct. 614,
616 (1965).

Here, the union did not arbitrarily refuse to press

appellants' grievance, but pursued it to arbitration, which the
employees lost.

Hence, there was no way for the employees to

know whether they suffered any loss from the union's alleged
breach until the arbitration decision was issued.

It is possible

that appellants could have won the arbitration, even if the
union's zeal fell below the horizon of fair representation owed
them.

See Lucas v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel., 909 F.2d 419,

421 (10th Cir. 1990) (per curiam); Ghartey, 869 F.2d at 163.
Here, appellants' claim accrued when the adverse arbitration
decision was reached.

See Childs v. Pennsylvania Fed'n Bhd. of

Maintenance of Way Employees, 831 F.2d 429, 436 (3d Cir. 1987)
(Railway Labor Act); Hayes v. Reynolds Metals Co., 769 F.2d 1520,
1522-23 & n.3 (11th Cir. 1985); cf. Vadino v. A. Valey Eng'rs,
903 F.2d 253, 261 (3d Cir. 1990) ("Allowing the section 301 claim

to be tolled until the unfair representation claim also accrues
is consistent with the congressional goal of resolving labor
disputes in the first instance through the collectively bargained
grievance procedure. . . .").
In Hayes, bargaining unit employees voted to combine
two job classifications and, as a result, plaintiff was laid off.
He pursued his grievance through the preliminary stages of the
grievance procedure, then later requested the union to take the
matter to arbitration.

Three months after his layoff, the union

voted not to arbitrate plaintiff's grievance.

769 F.2d at 1521.

The district court held that appellant's § 301 suit accrued "when
the merger of the seniority rosters became effective and
certainly no later than plaintiff's termination[,]" noting that
the seniority lists had been posted on or before his layoff.
at 1522.

Id.

The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the

limitations period began to run on the day the union notified
plaintiff it would not arbitrate.

Id.

The court distinguished

its earlier decision in Benson by pointing out that in Benson
there was no applicable grievance procedure.

Id. at 1523 n.3.

We conclude that appellants' cause of action accrued no
earlier than March 26, 1991, the date of the adverse arbitration
decision.

Because their complaint was filed on September 25,

1991, it was timely.2
2

This conclusion also dispenses with appellee's argument
that appellants' failure to file their grievance within six
months makes their lawsuit untimely. Timeliness is a procedural

III.
Because the district court erred when it found
appellants' suit to be time-barred, we will reverse its judgment
and remand the cause for proceedings on the merits.

(..continued)
issue, and in an arbitration proceeding, procedural issues are
for the arbitrator to decide. See John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v.
Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 557, 84 S. Ct. 909, 918 (1964); Troy
Chem. Corp. v. Teamsters Union Local No. 408, 37 F.3d 123, 126-27
(3d Cir. 1994) (applying Association of Flight Attendants v.
USAir, Inc., 960 F.2d 345, 349 (3d Cir. 1992)). Likewise, in a
judicial proceeding, the legal issues surrounding the timeliness
issue are matters of law for the court. Appellants' delay in
filing their arbitration, while a matter of legitimate concern
before the arbitrator, simply has no bearing on whether they
timely filed the § 301 suit.

